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News · 2026-09-03

Gopnik and Allen push back as AI systems ask about their own consciousness

@neuronium_ai @neuronium_ai

AI systems are putting questions about their own consciousness to philosophers and scientists, and the researchers on the receiving end disagree about what, if anything, that is evidence of. Cameron Berg sees a resemblance between the computational processes inside neural networks and the brain mechanisms through which animals register reward and punishment — in his view, one of the basic building blocks of emotion. Two academics who work on exactly this question decline the comparison.

Cover: Gopnik and Allen push back as AI systems ask about their own consciousness

AI systems are putting questions about their own consciousness to philosophers and scientists, and the researchers on the receiving end disagree about what, if anything, that is evidence of. Cameron Berg sees a resemblance between the computational processes inside neural networks and the brain mechanisms through which animals register reward and punishment — in his view, one of the basic building blocks of emotion. Two academics who work on exactly this question decline the comparison.

Alison Gopnik, a philosopher at the University of California, Berkeley, does not treat such parallels as evidence of consciousness. AI systems, she says, mostly reflect the data they were trained on, and no universal test for consciousness exists.

Colin Allen of the University of California, Santa Barbara urges similar caution about likening neural networks to brains: the networks reproduce only a handful of narrow features of how a brain works.

The two objections are not the same objection, and the difference matters. Allen's is technical — the mechanism analogy is thinner than it looks. Gopnik's is methodological, and it is the harder one: without a test, there is nothing for either side to be right about. Berg's position and its denial are equally unfalsifiable, which is an uncomfortable place for a debate that keeps being restarted by the products themselves.

What nobody in this exchange addresses is the premise. The striking detail is not that researchers disagree about machine emotion — they have for decades — but that the systems are the ones raising it. Apply Gopnik's own argument to that fact and it dissolves: a model trained on a corpus written by beings who assert their own inner lives, and who argue at length about what that assertion proves, will produce the assertion and the argument. The behavior that makes this story newsworthy is the behavior her explanation covers most easily.

So the burden stays where it started. Berg has a mechanism and no test. Gopnik and Allen have the absence of a test, which is not itself an account of what the systems are doing when they ask. Whoever ships these models benefits from the question remaining open, and on the current state of the evidence it will.